Eastern District of Virginia Court Permanently Enjoins Verizon's VOD Service
An Eastern District of Virginia Court has permanently enjoined Verizon from infringing upon patents of a California-based Company, ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. (“ActiveVideo”), including two patents which will have a direct impact upon Verizon’s ability to offer its popular Video on Demand (“VOD”) services. In the case, ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., et al., ActiveVideo sued Verizon for allegedly infringing upon several of its patents. After a three-week jury trial, the jury found in favor of ActiveVideo and awarded it $115,000,000 in damages for Verizon’s infringement. ActiveVideo then sought a permanent injunction from the Court enjoining Verizon from continuing to infringe upon the patents.
In analyzing the injunction standard under the Patent Act, Judge Raymond A. Jackson of the Eastern District of Virginia relied heavily upon the four-part test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the case of ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. The District Court found in favor of ActiveVideo regarding all four prongs finding that: 1) ActiveVideo had been, and would continue to be, irreparably harmed by Verizon’s unauthorized use of its technology; 2) ActiveVideo did not have an adequate monetary remedy at law because the continuing harm associated with loss of market share and brand recognition of the VOD service were difficult to quantify; 3) the balance of hardships favored ActiveVideo because, as a small company, it relied heavily upon the patents infringed upon by Verizon, while Verizon offered numerous services and would be less affected by having to cease use and/or find alternatives to offering the VOD service; and 4) public interests and public policy were served by protecting patent rights. Regarding this last prong, the Court specifically noted that, “[t]hough Verizon does add other components to be able to offer the completed product, Verizon’s FiOS system, and more specifically the VOD aspect of the FiOS system, could not function without the use of ActiveVideo’s technology.” Mem. Op. at 17.
Nevertheless, have no fear Verizon VOD users. The Court granted Verizon a six-month “sunset” window of time to come up with a non-infringing alternative to its current VOD system, and Verizon claims it has already been diligently working to come up with an alternative system. Therefore, before the time is up, it is likely Verizon will have embarked upon an alternative method to provide the popular VOD service to its customers – thus, enabling it to keep sending out those monthly Verizon bills to its subscribers at a brisk and healthy pace.
© Copyright, PCT Law Group 2011. All rights reserved.
EMPLOYEE ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD WITH SEXUAL HARASSMENT & RETALIATION CLAIMS
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a former city employee’s sexual harassment and retaliation claims to proceed to trial by reversing a lower court ruling which granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Plaintiff Katrina Okoli, formerly an executive assistant for John P. Stewart, the director of Baltimore’s Commission on Aging and Retirement, filed a lawsuit alleging sexual harassment hostile work environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and retaliation. In the case of Okoli v. City of Baltimore, et al., Plaintiff Okoli alleged that over a four month span, Defendant Stewart repeatedly sexually propositioned her; told her of his alleged sexual exploits; asked her about her underwear; fondled her leg underneath a table on several occasions; and forcibly tried to kiss her when they were alone in a conference room. Okoli alleged that she rejected such advances by Stewart and also twice complained about the harassment to officials within the City government, as well as wrote a letter to Baltimore’s then-mayor Martin O’Malley concerning the harassment. Okoli was fired by Stewart just hours after her letter was received by the mayor’s office.
For its part, the City contended (and apparently the lower court agreed) that Stewart’s conduct was sporadic and infrequent and did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. Further, the City argued that Okoli’s work had deficiencies, and that she was going to be fired even before she wrote the letter complaining of Stewart’s behavior. Additionally, the City argued, Okoli’s letter was non-specific and did not state that she was being “sexually” harassed by Stewart, only “harassed.” Therefore, they argued, Okoli did not engage in protected activity under Title VII to warrant a retaliation claim against the City.
The Appellate Court disagreed and held that the statements attributed to Stewart were both severe and pervasive. In addition, the Court held that a plaintiff need not mention the “magic words” of “sex” or “sexual” to effectively advance a sexual harassment complaint. Citing decisions from other circuit courts, the Court held that the complainant only need put the employer on notice that unlawful behavior is afoot. Okoli’s use of the words “unethical,” “degrading and dehumanizing” in her letter complaining about Stewart’s behavior were enough to raise a sexual harassment complaint. Finally, the Court determined that the district court erred in concluding that simply because Stewart had a document on his computer that pre-dated Okoli’s letter, such document was a termination letter. Stewart modified the computer document three times before delivering it to Okoli as a termination letter just hours after her sexual harassment complaint reached the mayor’s office. Under those facts, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to infer that Stewart did not intend to fire Okoli prior to receiving word that she complained about his behavior to the mayor and his staff.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals hears appeals involving Virginia employment cases.
© Copyright, PCT Law Group 2011. All rights reserved.
Fairfax County Circuit Court Awards Damages To IT Government Contractor In Non-Compete Case Against Subcontractor
A Fairfax County Circuit Court judge awarded a Virginia information technology government contractor $172,395 in damages in a non-compete case against a former subcontractor. The court determined that the defendant subcontractor breached the covenant not-to-compete provision in its consulting agreement with the plaintiff government contractor.
A Virginia court will enforce a non-compete clause between an employer and an employee if it is: sufficiently narrowly drawn to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest; not unduly burdensome on the employee’s ability to earn a living; and, not against public policy. As restrictive covenants are generally disfavored in Virginia (as they restrain free trade), the employer bears the burden of proof and any ambiguities in the contract are construed in favor of the employee.
In this case, the court concluded that the covenant not-to-compete at issue was enforceable because it only prevented the subcontractor from working for two companies; it proscribed competition for only a year; and, it was specific as to the type of work that was prohibited under the agreement between the parties.
The damages awarded by the court to the plaintiff government contractor were based on the lost profits that the non-compete clause was supposed to prevent. As the court noted, “[a]warding damages on the breach of the agreement protects plaintiff’s legitimate business interest by compensating it for the breach.”
Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting LLC, Circuit Court for Fairfax County, Virginia (July 28, 2011)
Virginia State Court: Contractor Can Pursue Assets of Subcontractor's Owner
After a less-than-satisfactory boiler improvement job done by a subcontractor, a Henrico County Circuit Court judge allowed the prime contractor to pierce the corporate veil and reach the personal assets of the subcontractor’s owner for damages related to this job. In this case, the Court found evidence that the sole shareholder of the subcontractor failed to uphold corporate formalities such as annual meetings and the maintenance of separate financial books for the company. Moreover, the subcontractor arranged for the corporation to enter into a contract while grossly undercapitalized. The finding resulted in a judgment worth $137,454 against the shareholder personally.
In Virginia, courts regard veil-piercing as an extraordinary remedy. Generally, each corporation is a separate legal entity with its own debts/liabilities and assets. However, under Virginia law, a court may pierce the corporate veil to find that an individual owner is the alter ego of a corporation where it finds (1) a unity of interest and ownership between the individual and the corporation, and (2) that the individual used the corporation to evade a personal obligation, to perpetrate fraud or a crime, to commit an injustice, or to gain an unfair advantage.
When deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts consider a variety of factors, including the intermingling of assets of the corporation and of the shareholder; the absence or inaccuracy of company records; and significant undercapitalization of the business entity. Virginia businesses must be cognizant of such corporate formalities and protocols in order to protect the personal assets of owners from potential liability.
U.S. District Court (Alexandria): No Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant In Website Defamation Case
The U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia (often referred to as the "rocket docket") recently held that a Canadian businessman who does business in Loudoun County, Virginia cannot sue an out-of-state resident who purportedly defamed the businessman on her website. The court concluded that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because there was no evidence that the defendant intended to target a Virginia audience with its website.
Under Virginia law, in order for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff must demonstrate that its lawsuit arises from activities that occurred in Virginia (“specific jurisdiction”). Alternatively, a plaintiff can establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant by showing that the defendant has such “continuous and systematic contacts” with Virginia that the defendant, for all intents and purposes, is domiciled in Virginia (“general jurisdiction”).
In this action, as the website did not target Virginia and the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence to show that the out-of-state defendant had a “continuous and systematic” presence in Virginia, the court held that it could not subject the defendant to jurisdiction in a Virginia court.
Knight v. Grayson and John Doe # 1, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division)
Eastern District of Virginia Court Allows FMLA Suit Against Individual County Official
Individual May Be Deemed an "Employer" Under the FMLA
Plaintiff Patricia Weth, formerly a deputy treasurer for litigation in the Arlington County Treasurer’s Office, took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for several weeks during December of 2009 until mid-February of 2010 to have medically necessary surgery performed. On the same day that she returned to work from her medical leave, Weth was told by her boss, Arlington County Treasurer Francis O’Leary, that he wanted her to find a new job and that her main focus should be finding a new job. O’Leary promptly stripped Weth of almost all of her job duties, and told her she was no longer to perform other job duties with the exception of one project and the duty of finding a new job. Predictably, under such facts, Weth filed claims of FMLA interference for the County’s failure to place her in the same or similar position after her FMLA leave as she had prior to the leave; and a claim of FMLA retaliation for her demotion and discharge after returning from FMLA leave. However, Weth’s lawsuit ran into a stumbling block concerning the appropriate defendant(s) to sue.
In the case of Weth v. Francis X. O’Leary, Plaintiff initially filed suit against Arlington County, the County Treasurer’s Office, and Defendant O’Leary. However, since County Treasurers such as O’Leary are deemed independent constitutional officers under the Virginia Constitution, the Court dismissed the case against the County and the Treasurer’s office as they were improper Defendants. Weth then filed an Amended Complaint against O’Leary in his official and individual capacity. On summary judgment, after dismissing the case against O’Leary in his official capacity based upon sovereign immunity, one of the main issues revolved around whether O’Leary, as a County official, could be sued under the FMLA in his individual capacity as an “employer”. Acknowledging that the issue remains an open question in the Fourth Circuit, and that there is a split on the issue within the federal courts, the Court looked to the text of the FMLA and the holding of a majority of the district courts that have ruled on the issue. In particular, the Court looked to the Fifth and Eight Circuits, which (relying upon the text of the FMLA) have held that public agency officials, including state officials, can be sued in their individual capacities if they act directly or indirectly on behalf of the employer. A prominent example of such authority being the hiring and firing of employees.
In this case, since O’Leary clearly had the authority to hire and fire employees such as Plaintiff Weth, the Court held that he could be sued in his individual capacity under the FMLA. The Court concluded that to rule otherwise would run contrary to the very text of the FMLA, which, in addition to including those with such authority as O’Leary in the definition of an employer, also states that “public agencies” are included within the definition of employer. Therefore, the Court ruled that Plaintiff Weth will be allowed to pursue her claims against Defendant O’Leary in his individual capacity at trial.
© Copyright, PCT Law Group 2011. All rights reserved.
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Cutting Through the Hoopla Over False Patent Marketing
There has been a lot of recent talk, blog posts, articles, court activity and even proposed legislation in Congress around the issue of “False Patent Marking.” What does it all mean and why should small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) care!? Well, I present answers, in brief, to these questions below.
The first thing to know is that the U.S. Patent Laws allow patent owners to give notice to the public by affixing a notice to the patented product (or its packaging if marking the product is not practical or possible) such as “Protected by U.S. Patent No. 3,141,592” See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). This is colloquially known as the “patent marking” statute. Absent such a marking, in most cases, a patent owner cannot recover damages for patent infringement unless they can prove the infringer was notified of the infringement.
Second, we know that affixing a patent notice to a product (or its packaging) not only acts as a deterrent to competitors by putting them on notice, but it also has some marketing cache! Thus, that is why it is common to see not only actual patent number notices, but also notices of “patent pending” on many products.
Third, there is also what is known as the “false marking” statute which prohibits anyone from marking a product (or its packaging) with:
- an expired patent number
- a false patent number
- with the words “patent applied for” or “patent pending” when no application for patent has been made or is no longer pending, respectively.
See 35 U.S.C. § 292. Each of these three false marking offenses, however, must be shown to have been done “for the purpose of deceiving the public,” and not merely done as a result a good faith mistake.
What makes the false marking statute interesting is that it contains a whistleblower-type provision. That is, any private citizen can sue the manufacturer of a product they believe has been falsely marked to recover “not more than $500 for every such offense.” Thus, one can imagine that if a company produces 1,000,000 units of a product that in some way was falsely marked, a $500M lawsuit becomes very attractive for anyone with the time and the right contingency law firm behind them. See Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In fact, over 150 of these types of lawsuits have been filed in the last several months alone! The only drawback is that 50% of any recovery must go to the federal government. (Thus, the private citizen in my example can keep only $250M of the possible recoveries – still not too shabby!)
On June 10, 2010, a federal court of appeals, interpreting the false marking statute, ruled that “the combination of a false [patent marking] and knowledge that the [patent marking] was false creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive the public.” See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., Case No. 2009-1547 (Fed. Cir.). A defendant in one of these false marking suits can successfully defend itself by showing via “a clear preponderance of the evidence that it did not have the requisite purpose to deceive.” For example, the defendant in the Solo Cup case successfully obtained a dismissal of the suit by explaining that they knew the patent number on their products had expired but it was prohibitively expensive and disruptive to the business to prematurely replace the manufacturing molds which contained the now-expired patent numbers.
So, what should SMEs glean from all this hoopla? Well, four things:
- If your enterprise manufactures no products covered by U.S. patents, ignore it;
- If your company has no patents that cover a specific product, do not “fake it until you make it” by marking it with one or more non-existent patent numbers;
- If your company has not applied for any patents that cover a specific product, do not use the words “patent pending” in an attempt to obtain marketing cache for such product; and
- If any of your competitors are manufacturing products which you suspect are falsely marked with an intent to deceive the public, consult a plaintiff’s lawyer!
Virginia Federal Jury Rules on Virginia Tech Equal Pay Case
A Virginia Federal Court jury recently determined that Virginia Tech violated the Equal Pay Act, and awarded back pay to two women employees of its fundraising office. The Equal Pay Act is a federal law amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, which prohibits employers from paying unequal wages to women and men for doing the same or substantially similar work.
To establish a case under the Equal Pay Act, an employee must establish that:
- different wages are paid to employees of the opposite sex;
- the employees perform substantially equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility; and
- the jobs are performed under similar working conditions.
However, an employee who proves all the above elements may still not prevail. A business may avoid liability if it establishes that such payment was made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor other than gender.
In the Virginia Tech cases, the two women claimed their starting salaries were lower than the men who did the same work. In its defense, Virginia Tech countered that the men had more experience when hired.
Both sides presented extensive statistical evidence. According to the plaintiff’s economist, men’s salaries involved with Virginia Tech’s fundraising were an average of 15% higher. Virginia Tech’s expert analyzed the experience and duties of the employees, and determined there was only an 8% difference. Tech's expert concluded that this difference could be linked to gender, but opined that there was a chance it occurred randomly since the disparity was not statistically significant.
Notably, one of the women testified that when she inquired about the pay differential between her and her male predecessor, the senior regional director of major gifts replied that her predecessor had a family to support. In addition, the Judge identified other statements that tend to show Virginia Tech's animus toward the women when he previously denied Virginia Tech's motion for summary judgment.
How does your company prevent potential liability under the Equal Pay Act? Businesses should evaluate its pay structure, including policies regarding seniority systems, merit systems and incentive systems in light of the prohibition of gender pay disparity. An effective way to prevent managers and supervisors from making compensation decisions based on a protected category under the discrimination laws is to establish and implement a comprehensive job evaluation system. As the lawyers for the women argued during the trial in this matter - if Virginia Tech "had good policies, we wouldn't be here."
FLSA Compliance for Company's Unpaid Interns
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As summer quickly approaches, businesses begin receiving an increasing number of offers for unpaid internships. As many businesses already know, there are many advantages to using an intern – unpaid internships may help fuel growth for your company and also provide an opportunity to mentor young professionals. However, unpaid interns can create legal troubles for the unwary business owner. Federal labor laws governing internships provide that the relationship has to benefit the intern more than the company. If it doesn’t, then the business must comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by paying minimum wages and possibly overtime.
The U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division outlined a list of criteria to determine whether a trainee or intern is an “employee” under the FLSA, and thus, must comply with Federal wage laws.
The following criteria provide guidance in evaluating internship programs for for-profit organizations, but it is important to note that each program is unique and must be carefully examined:
- the training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school;
- the training is for the benefit of the trainee;
- the trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close observation;
- that the employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion the employer’s operations may actually be impeded;
- the trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training period; and
- the employer and the trainee understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.
If your company’s internship program does not satisfy all of the above criteria, your interns may be considered “employees” under the FLSA. Hiring an intern, which qualifies as an “employee” may cost your company thousands in unpaid wages and legal fines!
So, how do you ensure compliance? Establish a written internship program outlining the terms and structure of the relationship in a way that the intern is receiving the full benefit of the learning experience, and ensure that your managers and other employees properly implement it.
Tips for Saving Money on Initial Patent and Trademark Services
It is clear that the economic downturn has lessened the appetite for companies to spend money on anything not perceived as a “necessary business expense.” The importance of intellectual property (IP) rights in a 21st century, knowledge economy, however, dictates that individual inventors and small- and medium-sized businesses (“SMBs”) find capital to file for patents and trademarks relating to their truly innovative products and services.
The above then begs the question: How can SMBs save money in hiring and engaging IP legal counsel? Well, the answer to this question contains many variables related to the specific IP attorney being hired. Such variables include the region where the IP attorney works, the size of law firm in which they practice, their level of experience, the complexity of the IP involved, etc.
The above variables aside, there is one constant in the price equation that I consistently advise SMBs to pay attention to – the preparation of their disclosure materials BEFORE meeting with any newly-engaged IP counsel. That is, SMBs (and individual entrepreneurs) can directly and significantly control their IP legal cost through careful preparation of their disclosure materials. I have seen $5000 legal bills turned into $15000 legal bills through the needless “back and forth” between an IP attorney who is “on the clock” and a client who has prematurely engaged such IP attorney. So, what do I mean by disclosure materials and how should an SMB prepare them? Well, I answer in two parts:
With respect to an invention needing a patent application, disclosure materials means an SMB gathering and organizing all relevant papers, sketches, drawings, notes, software code, formulations, etc. that provide the IP attorney with the following information:
- Title of the invention
- The full legal names, addresses and citizenship of all inventors
- The full name, address and state of incorporation of the company who will own the patent (if any)
- A description of the problem solved by the invention
- A description of how long the problem has been around and how have others tried to solve the problem
- A description of how the invention solves the problem differently than past solutions or attempted solutions
- System diagrams showing all hardware/software components of the invention
- Flowcharts illustrating the steps of the invention
- A list any known websites, publications, patents, products, services, etc. that are relevant to the subject matter of the invention
- A description of how the invention relates to the launch of a new product or service
- Dates the invention was (or will be): first conceived; implemented as a pilot or otherwise used in the public domain; reduced to actual practice; the subject of a publication or public disclosure; sold or offered for sale; and/or internally exploited
With respect to a mark or logo needing a trademark application, disclosure materials means an SMB gathering and organizing the following information to provide to the IP attorney:
- A description of the mark
- The full name, address and state of incorporation of the entity who will own the trademark
- A description of all the types of products and/or services with which the mark is actually used or will be used
- Date of any first sale of goods bearing the mark in interstate commerce
- Copies of any specimens showing the mark as it is currently (or will be) used on or in connection with the goods or services
- A description of how the mark is actually used or intended to be used
A prepared and organized client is one who receives efficient IP legal services and a reasonable legal bill from their IP attorney, and is consequently glad to pay that reasonable bill!
Who Owns Newly-Created IP within a University Community?
I was recently contacted by a professor who was seeking advice about a piece of intellectually property (IP) he created, and that his university was profitably exploiting. Who owned the IP? Can he exploit it himself? Was he entitled to share in the proceeds above and beyond his university (base) salary? Not surprisingly, these questions are not rare. After all, universities, colleges and research institutions are hot beds of creativity. In 2008, U.S. universities and research institutions spent over $51.47B in R&D and received 3,280 issued U.S. patents, all while forming 595 new companies in IP “spin-outs.” [1]
Given this setting, who then owns the IP created by someone within a university community? Intuitively, the answer seems simple in the case of a tenured, research professor who develops IP related to their university research duties – the university owns it! But how about the case of an undergraduate student who creates IP totally unrelated to any of her coursework!? The student? How about certain university community citizens, such as university executives, administrators, (exempt or nonexempt) staff, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, wage payroll employees, adjunct faculty, emeritus or retired faculty, visiting scholars and others? The analysis for those university community citizens is often a fact-intensive endeavor.
In general, under varying applicable state and federal laws where the university employs the individual in question, there is a presumption that the employee owns the rights to their IP, even though it may have been created during the course of their employment. This general rule, however, has two exceptions and one limitation.
- First Exception: If the employee has an express employment agreement, stating the contrary (i.e., an employee agreement assigning all IP to the employer/university), then the general rule does not apply.
- Second Exception: If the employee was specifically “hired to invent,” later directed to solve a specific problem, or his employment requires that he exercise his “inventive faculties,” then the above-stated general rule also does not apply.
- Limitation: Even when none of the two exceptions to the above-stated general rule apply, the employer – in the case of patented inventions – may have a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free license to practice the employee’s patented invention if it was made using the resources of the employer. This is known as an employer’s “shop right.”
An overwhelming majority of universities have an “official intellectual property policy” that requires employees, as a condition to employment, to assign their IP rights under certain circumstances (e.g., when university funds or facilities are involved in the creation of the IP). Thus, most situations fall under the above-stated first exception even though many professors and postdoctoral fellows fail to read such policies when they sign their employment agreements!
So what about the case of the undergraduate student who created IP totally unrelated to any of her coursework? What if that IP was created without a professor’s help? Well, in a recent reported case having those exact facts, a university’s lawyers demanded a 25% ownership stake and two-thirds of any profits from four undergraduate students who created a popular iPhone® application in their dorm room! Although the university eventually backed down, one campus technology transfer expert has observed that many universities “generally seek to retain ownership, or at least have a formalized mechanism for assessing ownership of a student’s work in much the same way they would regarding a faculty member’s work.”
In sum, those working/learning/creating within a university community should become familiar with their university’s intellectual property policy at the start of their affiliation, and pay attention to the agreements they sign as a part of the new university employee “on-boarding” process. And, when potentially valuable new IP is created, be vigilant about asserting their rights in such IP.
[1] Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity Survey, FY2008: Survey Summary.
$3 Million Personal Injury Claim Against Virginia Business Dismissed
We have all been there. Walking through the aisle of a store and some store personnel who was stocking a shelf has left a ladder or some supplies right in the middle of the aisle, obstructing the path. Well, the Plaintiff in this case did what most of us would do. She attempted to walk around the ladder, but when she did -- bam! – she hit her head on a metal shelf that was on the other side of ladder, and she (sadly) suffered significant, and likely permanent, brain injury.
In this diversity jurisdiction personal injury case, Zankow v. Sears Holding Corp., et al., Plaintiff claimed that Sears was negligent because the placement of the ladder combined with the shelves in the narrow aisle created an unreasonably dangerous condition that caused her serious and permanent injuries. The shelves were 1 to 1.5 inches thick and were connected to the back of a shelving unit with no side walls. While trying to get around the ladder, Plaintiff apparently did not notice the shelves as she was focused on the ladder – the original obstruction.
For its part, Defendant claimed that it should not be held liable as the ladder and the shelves were in plain sight; and, in any event, because Plaintiff failed to use ordinary and reasonable care in walking around the ladder, she was contributorily negligent and barred from recovery.
On summary judgment, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The Court ruled that from the pictures submitted by the Plaintiff of the scene (which were attached to the Opinion) and the description provided, the shelf and the ladder were “open and obvious” conditions from which Plaintiff had a duty to use reasonable care to avoid. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the shelf she hit her head on was protruding, because the evidence showed that no one shelf stuck out further than the others. Further, the Court did not find that the combination of the ladder and the shelves rendered either of the hazards “latent” such that Plaintiff would not have been expected to notice and avoid the open and obvious hazards. Citing Virginia Supreme Court precedent, the Court ruled that once a hazard is deemed to be open and obvious, an injured plaintiff’s claim must fail as a matter of law since she will be deemed to have failed to exercise reasonable care, and will thus be found contributorily negligent.
Federal Employee's Discrimination & Retaliation Claims Dismissed
Federal employee Robert T. Perry (“Perry”) had a long-running legal battle with his federal employer, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”). After three lawsuits, two of which were settled, Perry’s claims of hostile work environment and retaliation have now been dismissed on summary judgment.
The case, Perry v. Gotbaum, was the third lawsuit brought by Perry against the PBGC and centered around Perry’s allegations that the PBGC discriminated and retaliated against him based upon a Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties to settle the first two lawsuits. As required under the Settlement Agreement, the PBGC provided Perry with a grade and step increase in salary, paid for $10,000 worth of training, paid Perry a lump sum of $60,000, and placed him on Leave Without Pay (“LWOP”) Status for a time-period not to exceed six months. In addition to proving Perry with a salary increase and training, it appears that the impetus behind the Settlement Agreement was to provide Perry with an opportunity to find employment outside of the PBGC and give him a lump sum payment during his job search. Per federal government regulations, the personnel actions required under the Settlement Agreement had to be documented using a federal government Standard Form 50 (“SF-50”).
In his third lawsuit, Perry complained, inter alia, that the comments section of the SF-50 forms used to process the personnel actions included information referencing his prior lawsuits and the Settlement Agreement. According to Perry, such comments would have a chilling effect on his ability to seek employment outside of the PBGC because it would be clear that he had engaged in protected activity. Further, Perry complained that the PBGC had used a more generic code when processing SF-50 forms for other employees, and therefore he should have been afforded the same treatment.
While the Court agreed with Perry that he engaged in protected activity regarding his prior lawsuits and the resulting Settlement Agreement, the Court ruled in favor of the PBGC finding that the Agency actually went back and corrected the SF-50 forms to respond to Perry’s concerns about the remarks placed on the forms. Further, since the Settlement Agreement was not confidential and had been filed with the Court, it was a public record and Perry could not base his claims of a retaliatory and/or discriminatory disclosure upon information that was generally available to the public. In addition, the Court found that there was no basis to find the PBGC’s “honest mistake” was an attempt to hamper Perry’s future job opportunities since it was in the Agency’s interest to have Perry find employment outside of the PBGC as soon as possible. As such, the Court dismissed Perry’s federal employment discrimination and retaliation claims.
It should be noted that the legal standard applied by the Court in this public sector case applies to private sector Virginia businesses as well.
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: Employer May be Liable for Harassment by Customer
In an unpublished decision, the Fourth Circuit Court Appeals recently held that an employer may be liable for third-party harassment by a customer if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate actions to halt it. The evidence of repeated complaints to supervisors and managers by the employee created a triable issue as to whether the employer had notice of the harassment, and thus, the Appeals Court allowed this claim to go forward to trial.
In EEOC v. Cromer Food Services, Incorporated, a route driver for a southeastern vending machine company alleged he suffered daily sexual harassment at the hands of two housekeeper employees of one of the company’s largest customers – a hospital. According to the driver, the harassment began after a co-worker left a note in the hospital cafeteria calling him gay. Following this incident, the two male hospital employees allegedly began harassing him with unwanted sexual comments.
The driver claims he complained to numerous people at CFS, including his supervisor, his direct supervisor, another supervisor, a manager of the company, and the chairman of the Board. As the harassment continued, he took more drastic measures by reporting the harassment directly to a human resources professional at the hospital and to the supervisor of the two hospital employees. But, the hospital employees were unrelenting.
In response to this lawsuit, the company asserted that it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment because the complaints by the driver were vague and insufficiently detailed for action to be taken. In addition, the company pointed out that the employee failed to report the harassment to its President in accordance with the company’s written sexual harassment protocol.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the claim. In doing so, it noted that the District Court focused on only one snippet of the driver’s deposition testimony which stated that he did not provide details of the harassment to the company. The Appeals Court acknowledged that although anti-harassment law requires notice to the employer – it should not require it to be pellucid.
The Fourth Circuit also pointed out the flaws in the employer’s approach in this matter. The Court stated that harassment claims could not be avoided by utilizing a “see no evil, hear no evil” strategy, and it criticized the protocol requiring reports to be made to the President by recognizing that such requirement may likely intimate an employee. Moreover, the Court drew attention to the fact that management failed to report the harassment up the chain of command as required by company policy.
This case illustrates to employers within the Fourth Circuit (which includes Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, West Virginia and South Carolina) that a company’s written policy for reporting harassment may not provide insulation from liability under Title VII. Virginia businesses must ensure that they have a reasonable process in place to address allegations of harassment by its employees and third parties.
Non-Compete Ruled Unenforceable by Virginia Circuit Court
For several years now, many practitioners that advise and/or draft non-competes for their business clients have stopped including language in non-compete provisions which prohibit a former employee from being an “owner” or “shareholder” in a competing business. Virginia Courts have routinely held that including language which prohibits a former employee from essentially owning stock in a competing business was overbroad and not necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business interest. Therefore, such non-competes have regularly been invalidated.
Consistent with prior court opinions, a Virginia Beach Circuit Court recently invalidated a non-compete provision which prohibited a former employee from, inter alia, being an owner or shareholder in a competing business. The case, Patient First Richmond Medical Group, LLC v. Ameanthea Rica Blanco (Virginia Beach Circuit Court, Feb. 15, 2011), involved Defendant Blanco, a family nurse practitioner who was employed by Plaintiff Patient First. According to the allegations in the case, Blanco, while still working at Patient First, began formation of a competing healthcare practice which was to provide primary and urgent care treatment at reasonable or fixed fees during extended weekday and weekend hours without the need for an appointment.
Blanco also solicited two doctors from Patient First to come work with her at the new medical practice. After she resigned her position with Patient First, Blanco opened up the competing business within seven miles of her former place of employment. Patient First brought suit alleging that Blanco violated her employment agreement which contained non-competition and non-solicitation provisions.
The covenant not to compete prohibited Blanco from performing medical services of the type performed for Patient First (though the term “medical services” was not defined) for two years after her employment and within a seven-mile radius as an “agent, officer, director, member, partner, shareholder, independent contractor, owner, or employee” of the competing business. The Court found that the non-compete provision was overbroad because its provisions went beyond occupations and businesses that were in competition with Patient First. The Court reasoned that by barring Blanco from being a shareholder in a competing business, she would be barred from merely owning stock in a publically traded company, even if she were not providing medical services for the company and thus not competing with Patient First.
The Court also held that a number of the terms in the provision were not defined and left too much uncertainty as to which activities of the former employee would, or would not, be in violation of the covenant. Therefore, an employee would essentially have to guess at which conduct was prohibited. The Court held that in such cases, the non-compete was unenforceable as offending sound public policy, and sustained Blanco’s demurrer without leave for Patient First to amend.
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