Alexandria Federal Court Transfers Venue to California in Patent Infringement Suit
Plaintiff’s attempt to litigate in the Rocket Docket because it desired a "quick, efficient and consistent resolution of its claims" was recently thwarted. In an opinion from late January, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia Federal Court (commonly referred to as the “Rocket Docket”) transferred venue in a patent infringement case to California because it found the plaintiff patent holding company’s connection to this district was tenuous.
Pursuant to the patent venue statute, patent infringement lawsuits may be brought against a defendant anywhere that the company is subject to personal jurisdiction. The purpose of venue statutes is to provide a logical and efficient forum for the resolution of disputes, but the patent venue statute provides plaintiffs with a great deal flexibility in choosing where to litigate.
The case of Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., YouTube LLC, LinkedIn Corporation, and Photobucket.com Inc. involves three patents related to the storage, distribution, and playback of media files. The plaintiff company, Pragmatus, is a patent holding company that was incorporated in Virginia a week after it acquired the patent portfolio at issue. A few days after the last patent was issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Pragmatus filed suit alleging the video uploading and linking technology on the defendant companies’ websites infringed on its patents.
The Alexandria Federal Court considered the convenience of the parties, and the witness convenience and access in determining to transfer venue to California. In analyzing this issue, the Court noted that the inventors of the patents and attorney who prosecuted the applications are located in California; and three of the four defendants are headquartered in California, and the other defendant has offices in Denver and San Francisco. The Court determined that these factors weighed in favor of transferring venue to California.
The Rocket Docket is an attractive forum for business litigation due to its efficiency – continuances are rare; weekly motions; relatively short discovery period; and trials within eight months from filing. However, a party must be able to prove a legitimate connection to the forum in order to maintain suit in this Court. As this case illustrates, patent holding companies raise a particular concern in this regard since their business is most often limited to enforcement of IP rights – not invention or development of the technology at issue.
US Supreme Court: Title VII's Antiretaliation Provision Covers Third Parties
In a unanimous recent opinion, the United States Supreme Court broadly construed the term “person aggrieved” in Title VII's antiretaliation provision to include a co-worker who is a relative or close associate of a targeted employee.
In the case of Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, Plaintiff Thompson worked as a metallurgic engineer for North American Stainless (“NAS”), the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Kentucky. Thompson began dating a coworker, and thereafter they became engaged to be married. According to the lawsuit, the couple’s engagement was common knowledge at the facility. Three weeks after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notified NAS that Thompson’s fiancée had filed a discrimination charge, NAS fired Thompson. Thompson pursued a retaliation claim against NAS for his discharge.
NAS moved for dismissal of the case before trial, contending that Thompson’s claim of third-party retaliation under Title VII was insufficient as a matter of law. The trial court granted NAS’s motion for summary judgment, which decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In denying Thompson a trial, the Sixth Circuit joined several other appeals courts in holding that the authorized class of claimants under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is limited to persons who have personally engaged in protected activity.
The Supreme Court disagreed, and rejected this narrow interpretation of aggrieved persons under the law. However, it declined to expand the provision into the outer boundaries of the standing standard set forth in Article III of the Constitution – which would allow anyone who claimed an injury by a Title VII violation to sue. The Court noted that such expansive interpretation would allow a shareholder to sue a company for firing a valuable employee for racial discriminatory reasons if he showed a decrease in his stock value as a consequence.
In settling on the middle ground, the Supreme Court stated that “Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct.” The Court’s concern was to prohibit employer action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from asserting or supporting a discrimination claim. Thompson fell within the zone of interests protected by the law.
Employment Pointer: This decision clears up the ambiguity over whether third parties have standing to sue for retaliation under Title VII. Although, the Court noted that there is no bright line test for who is protected. Given the broader scope of persons to be protected under this law, companies must be aware of its management’s underlying reasons for adverse employment actions and ensure that indirect revenge against an employee for filing a discrimination charge has not been a contributing factor.
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